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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Tommy D. Cole appeals from the judgment entered upon the district court’s order 
summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.  
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings 
 
 According to the Idaho Court of Appeals’ unpublished opinion in Cole’s direct appeal, the 
facts underlying his criminal convictions are as follows: 
The state charged Cole with two counts of aggravated assault and one count 
of operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent following a confrontation 
between Cole, his ex-wife, and another male outside of a bar.  Evidence at trial 
showed that Cole observed his ex-wife and the male inside a bar.  When the male 
and female exited the bar and as the female was getting into her vehicle, Cole 
emerged from the backseat of the vehicle, confronted the female with a firearm, 
and threatened to kill both the female and the male.  The female retreated back into 
the bar.  Cole followed her, continued to threaten her, and pointed the firearm at 
her.  Subsequently, the male came to the front door of the bar and got Cole’s 
attention.  Cole chased the male back outside and pointed the firearm at him.  The 
female hid inside the bar with the bartender and contacted the police.  Before the 
police arrived, Cole left the scene in the female’s vehicle, which was later found 
abandoned.  Cole was arrested three days later.  
Prior to trial, the state filed notice of its intent to introduce certain evidence 
at trial.  Specifically, the State gave notice that it intended to offer statements 
allegedly made by Cole to the female over the telephone the day following the 
incident at the bar.  Cole objected, arguing that the admission of the alleged 
statements was impermissible pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b).  After a 
hearing, the district court ruled that the state could offer the phone statements into 
evidence.  At trial, the female offered testimony concerning these phone statements.  
A jury found Cole guilty of the two counts of aggravated assault, I.C. §§ 18–901(b) 
and 18–905(a), and operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent, I.C. § 
49–227.   
 
State v. Cole, 2016 WL 455803 *1 (Idaho App., Feb. 2, 2016).   
Cole appealed, challenging the admission of Cole’s phone statements.  The Idaho Court of 
Appeals held that the admission of those statements constituted harmless error, and explained: 
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In this case, both the male and female testified that Cole hid inside the female’s 
vehicle.  As the female was getting into the vehicle, Cole emerged from the 
backseat, pointed a firearm at her, and threatened to kill both she and the male.  
Both victims and the bartender testified that Cole pursued the female as she 
retreated to the bar and continued to threaten her with the firearm pointed at her.  
Further, all three witnesses testified that Cole, upon seeing the male in the doorway, 
turned and pursued the male outside.  Both victims testified that Cole pointed the 
firearm and repeatedly threatened the male.  The bartender testified that she too saw 
Cole pointing something at the male.  After locking the door to bar [sic], both the 
female and the bartender hid inside and the female contacted the police.  The female 
testified that later, upon emerging from a hiding place inside the bar, she found her 
vehicle missing.  The male testified that Cole had taken the vehicle and had driven 
it away.  The female testified that she had not given Cole permission to take her 
vehicle. 
Additionally, the testimony from both victims, the bartender and the responding 
officer, as well as the 911 recording, all support that both victims were scared and 
frightened during and after the incident.  Finally, testimony was offered from a third 
party who, two weeks prior to the incident, traded a .22 semi-automatic pistol with 
a black handle and a stainless silver barrel to Cole in exchange for mechanical work.  
The same firearm description was used by each of the victims and the bartender 
when testifying about the description of the firearm Cole used the night of the 
incident. 
Consequently, based on the evidence before the jury, there was extensive and 
convincing evidence presented at trial to demonstrate that Cole utilized a firearm 
and intentionally threatened by word or act to do violence to both victims, thereby 
causing them to imminently fear that violence. See I.C. §§ 18–901(b) and 18–
905(a). 
 
Id. at *5.   
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Post-Conviction Proceedings 
Cole filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief (R., pp.5-11), alleging that his various 
trial counsel were “ineffective at all stages of the proceedings” in the following ways: 
(1) No in court ID = possible mistaken ID on certain relevant facts material to 
necassary [sic] requisit [sic]. 
 
(2) Evidence in support of N.T. + Rule 35 was evidence the attorney should’ve 
discovered prior to trial[.] 
 
(3) Jon Hally interviewed witness’s [sic] that could have backed up my story and 
undermined plaintiffs [sic] integrity and didnt [sic] call them to trial. 
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(R., p.7 (verbatim except numbering and capitalization modified).)  In his supporting affidavit, 
Cole presented a fourth claim – that one of his trial attorneys failed to stay in contact with him, 
rarely returned his calls, and “prejudiced [his] case by disclosing information to the prosecution.”   
(R., p.10.) 
After the district court granted Cole’s request for appointed counsel (R., pp.12-14, 21-22), 
his counsel filed four exhibits (R., pp.38, 41, 43, 44-46) and two “additional affidavits” (R., pp.52-
54).  The state filed an answer to Cole’s petition and moved to summarily dismiss it, arguing that 
the claims therein were bare and conclusory and not supported by specific facts or evidence 
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.  (R., pp.16-20.)  After a hearing, the court entered 
a written opinion granting the state’s motion for summary dismissal.  (R., pp.69-73; see generally 
1/30/17 Tr.)  The court entered its final judgment of dismissal on February 8, 2017.  (R., pp.74-





 Cole’s Appellant’s Brief does not state an issue on appeal. 
The state phrases the issue on appeal as: 











 The district court dismissed Cole’s post-conviction petition because, under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), he “presented no admissible evidence that shows that his 
counsels’ performance prejudiced the outcome of his trial.”  (R., pp.71-72.)  Cole challenges the 
summary dismissal of his petition, arguing that while the court addressed “some of the evidence 
in support of the petition, it simply ignore[d] other evidence with Petitioner’s opposition to the 
state’s motion for summary dismissal and follow-up affidavits.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.) 
Cole’s argument fails.  He has failed to show error in either the scope of the district court’s 
review of the relevant evidence or its application of the law to the facts in concluding that Cole 
failed to carry his burden of presenting a genuine issue of material fact to overcome the summary 
dismissal of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the appellate court 
reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists which, if resolved in 
petitioner’s favor, would require relief to be granted.  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 
P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). 
 
C. Cole Has Failed To Show Any Ground For Reversal Based On His Contention That The 
District Court Failed To Consider Evidence Relevant To His Claims 
 
Cole argues that “since the court erroneously disregarded some of the evidence provided 
by [him] and did not even consider additional evidence, the court erred by summarily dismissing 
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the petition.”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-10.)   Cole asserts that the court totally failed to address (1) 
the disparity between Nicole Lowe’s statement, “I’m not afraid,” in her request to modify the no 
contact order (R., p.38) and her trial testimony that she was “still scared” (R., p.41); and (2) Mandy 
Doherty’s unsigned typed statement that Sean Reid and Nicole Lowe tormented Cole “whenever 
he came to town or drove past the bar” and that she “witnessed an incident when Sean pointed a 
gun at Mr. Cole and pretended to shoot him” (Appellant’s Brief, p.8; see R., pp.38, 41, 44).       
In essence, Cole contends the district court must have considered only the information it 
specifically addressed in its written decision granting the state’s motion for summary dismissal.  
Cole has failed to cite to any authority supporting such an assumption.  See State v. Zichko, 129 
Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“When issues on appeal are not supported by 
propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered.”).  Moreover, the court’s 
ruling that Cole “presented no admissible evidence which shows how he was prejudiced by his 
counsel not calling witnesses in his defense” (R., p.72) indicates that the court did consider all the 
statements presented by Cole regardless of whether they were mentioned in the court’s summary 
dismissal order.     
Even assuming the district court did not consider the information Cole cites, he has failed 
to show that such lack of consideration would, by itself, constitute any basis for reversal.  “On 
review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this 
Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists based on the pleadings, 
depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file.”  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 
518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 
791 (2002)).  Because this Court conducts an independent review of the record to determine 
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whether summary dismissal is appropriate, whether the district court actually considered the 
information Cole claims was ignored is legally irrelevant. 
 
D. Cole Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Determination That He Failed To 
Present A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him To An Evidentiary Hearing On 
Any Of His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims 
 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction 
relief in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own initiative.  “To withstand summary 
dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to 
each element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.”  State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 
833 (2000)).  Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-4906 “if the applicant’s evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact” as to each 
element of petitioner’s claims.  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) 
(citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.   
While a court must accept a petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not 
required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 
(citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)).  If the alleged facts, even if 
true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, the trial court is not required to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition.  Id. (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 
801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)).  “Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the 
granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or 
(2) do not justify relief as a matter of law.”  Id. 
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Cole’s post-conviction petition and supporting affidavit alleged his various trial counsel 
were ineffective for (1) not obtaining an in-court identification of Cole “on certain relevant facts,” 
(2) failing to discover, prior to trial, evidence supporting his motion for a new trial and his Rule 
35 motion, (3) failing to call witnesses at trial who could have supported Cole’s “story and 
undermined [the prosecution’s] integrity[,]” and (4) disclosing information to the prosecution.  (R., 
pp.7, 10.) 
To overcome summary dismissal of these claims, Cole was required to demonstrate that 
“(1) a material issue of fact exist[ed] as to whether counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) a 
material issue of fact exist[ed] as to whether the deficiency prejudiced [Cole’s] case.”  Baldwin v. 
State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362, 367-68 (2008) (internal citations omitted); see also 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 (a petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must show 
both deficient performance and resulting prejudice).  To establish deficient performance, the 
burden was on Cole “to show that his attorney’s conduct fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.  This objective standard embraces a strong presumption that trial counsel was 
competent and diligent.”  Id.  “[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on 
appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or 
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation.”  Id.  To establish prejudice, Cole was required 
to show “a reasonable probability that but for his attorney’s deficient performance the outcome of 
the proceeding would have been different.”  Id.   
Application of the foregoing legal standards to the facts of this case supports the district 
court’s order of summary dismissal; Cole failed to demonstrate from his pleadings and evidence 
that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the prejudice prong of his ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims. 
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1. Claim 1 
 
Cole failed to present any admissible evidence to sufficiently support any of his claims.  
The district court properly dismissed Cole’s first claim (Claim 1) that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for not having witnesses identify him at trial, ruling, “[h]e provides no evidence or 
elaboration on that claim so that the Court can even determine what he is referring to.  This Claim 
will not be considered.”  (R., p.72.)  Cole does not challenge the summary dismissal of that claim 
on appeal; therefore, it is not subject to review.  (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-10.)  Even if 
considered, the record shows Cole did not support his claim with admissible evidence, nor did he 
explain which witnesses should have been asked by trial counsel to identify Cole during trial or 
how such identification would have resulted in a different outcome at trial.  (See R., pp.7, 10-11; 
38, 43-46, 52-54.)  The court did not err in summarily dismissing Claim 1 based on Cole’s failure 
to present admissible evidence showing his trial counsel’s conduct prejudiced him.  (See R., p.72.) 
 
2. Claims 2 And 4 
Cole also appears to not challenge the summary dismissal of Claims 2 and 4.  (See 
Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-10.)  Regardless, the district court properly dismissed those two claims.1   
In Claim 2, Cole alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to discover evidence that 
                                                          
1  It is axiomatic that the appellant bears the burden of providing a sufficient record to substantiate 
his or her appellate claims.  State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105, 803 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Ct. App. 
1991).  The post-conviction record on appeal does not automatically include the record of the 
underlying criminal case.  Esquivel v. State, 149 Idaho 255, 259, n.3, 233 P.3d 186, 190, n.3 (Ct. 
App. 2010).  Because the record of the underlying criminal proceeding was not made a part of the 
post-conviction record or the record on appeal, there is no record of what evidence was presented 
in the two motions.  “In the absence of an adequate record on appeal to support the appellant’s 
claims, [the appellate court] will not presume error.”  State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 38, 43 
P.3d 794, 797 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Beason, 119 Idaho at 105, 803 P.2d at 1011).  To the 
contrary, any missing portions of the record are presumed to support the actions of the court below.  
State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541, 835 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Ct. App. 1992).   
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was subsequently presented in his motion for a new trial and Rule 35 motion. (R., p.7.)  However, 
in his petition and supporting documents, Cole failed to explain what evidence his trial counsel 
did not discover before trial, or how the discovery of such evidence would have probably resulted 
in a different verdict, as required by Strickland.  (See R., pp.7, 10-11; 38, 43-46, 52-54.)  In regard 
to Claim 4, Cole failed to allege what information his attorney disclosed to the prosecution, or how 
such disclosure may have prejudiced him at trial.  (See id.)  In short, Cole has not shown any error 
in the district court’s summary dismissal of Claims 2 and 4 on the ground that “Cole has presented 
no admissible evidence that shows that his counsels’ performance prejudiced the outcome of his 
trial.”  (R., p.72.)   
 
3. Claim 3 
In Claim 3, Cole alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call witnesses 
at trial that could have supported his “story and undermined [the prosecution’s] integrity[.]”  (R., 
p.7.)  The district court explained that Cole presented several affidavits contending “that although 
this matter was self-defense, his attorney did not offer that as a defense.”  (R., p.72.)  The court 
initially determined, “Cole offers no proof that he believed he was in imminent danger of death or 
bodily [sic] or that he believed his assault of his ex-wife and friend were necessary to save him 
from the danger presented[,]” and that the Court was “not required to accept conclusory allegations 
unsupported by admissible evidence or the petitioner’s conclusions of law.”  (R., p.71 (citing State 
v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560, 199 P.3d 123, 135 (2008).)  The court also explained that Cole 
“refers to a list of witnesses that he believes would have been useful to prove his innocence if they 
had been called, but does not elaborate on how their testimony would have changed the outcome 
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of the trial.”  (R., p.71)  In support of Claim 3, Cole filed five relevant documents, which are 
described, then discussed, in turn.2 
 
(a) Differing Statements By Nicole Lowe About Being Fearful Of Cole 
 
1. “Request to Modify or Dismiss No Contact Order,” file-stamped January 
25, 2013.  The document is allegedly signed by Nicole L. Lowe, and states 
in relevant part, “Enough time has passed – We’ve moved on – I’m not afrai 
[last letter(s) unclear].”  (R., p.38.) 
 
2. Part of the transcribed trial testimony of Nicole Lowe in which she testified 
that she was “still scared” of Cole.  (R., p.41 (Tr., p.178, L.24).) 
 
 The district court concluded that Cole failed to present any admissible evidence to show 
that he was prejudiced by his trial counsels’ performance.  (R., p.72.)  On appeal, Cole has not 
advanced any argument that contradicts the district court’s ruling.  (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-
10.)  Moreover, because the written statement, “I’m not afraid,” on the Request to Modify or 
Dismiss No Contact Order was not notarized or otherwise authenticated as having been written by 
Nicole Lowe, the statement was not presented in the form of admissible evidence, and should be 
rejected on that basis.  Even if Nicole Lowe had acknowledged at trial that she wrote the statement 
on January 25, 2013, her lack of fear for Cole on that (2013) date would not be relevant to whether 
she feared him when he assaulted her with a gun on October 18, 2012.  Similarly, the fact that 
Lowe testified at the February 2014 trial that she was still scared of Cole does next to nothing to 
                                                          
2  Cole filed the same statement of Barbara O’Nash twice.  The first statement was typed and 
unsigned (R., p.43), and the second statement bore a signature of “Barbara O’Nash” and a notary 
public’s stamp and apparent signature, but lacked any statement verifying that the person who 
signed the document was Barbara O’Nash (R., p.54).   
 
Also, Cole filed an Idaho County Sheriff’s Office Statement Form filled out by Nicole 
Lowe, dated 10/19/12, describing Cole’s actions at the Silver Dollar Bar the night of the incident.  
(R., pp.45-46.)  On appeal, Cole says Lowe’s statement “confirmed Bessie was there” (Appellant’s 
Brief, p.8), in reference to Barbara O’Nash’s statement about Bessie’s comments to her, which 
will be discussed later in this brief.  Lowe’s written police statement needs no further mention.  
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impeach her credibility.  Ms. Lowe could have had a valid explanation based on more recent events 
for why she was scared of Cole.  Rather than prejudicing him, Cole may have benefitted by the 
fact that his trial counsel did not risk opening the door for Ms. Lowe to testify about recent conduct 
by Cole that may have caused her to be scared of him.  Any impeachment value in the disparity of 
Ms. Lowe’s two statements, which were 13 months apart, would have had no demonstrated impact 
on the jury.  Cole has failed to show any error in the district court’s summary dismissal of Claim 
3 based on a lack of prejudice, as required under Strickland. 
  
(b) Barbara O’Nash’s Statement  
3. Barbara O’Nash’s typed statement that, although she was not in the bar the 
evening of the incident, her daughter-in-law (“Bessie”) “saw the whole 
thing and told [her] what happened,” which was that Cole did not aim the 
gun at the victims, nor did he “threaten their lives with it, he held it to his 
side.”  (R., pp.43, 54 (see n.2, supra).)  Bessie “was in the back room 
gambling on the machines and didn’t even know [Cole] was there with a 
gun.  She couldn’t tell the truth because then her boss would know she 
wasn’t doing her job.”  (Id.)  Nicole Lowe told Ms. O’Nash one day that she 
did not want to testify against Cole, but Sean had threatened to leave her if 
she did not.  Also, the night that Cole’s home and shop burned down, 
“someone was seen sitting in Nicole’s truck at the top of the hill, just across 
the river, watching it burn.”  (Id.)  
 
 The district court correctly ruled that Barbara O’Nash’s statement about what her daughter-
in-law (Bessie) and Nicole Lowe told her was hearsay and not admissible.  (R., p.72; see I.R.E. 
801, 802.)  On appeal, Cole has not argued otherwise; therefore he has failed to show any error in 
the district court’s summary dismissal of Claim 3 in regard to the concededly hearsay statement of 
Barbara O’Nash.  (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-8 (“[The court] did address the hearsay statement 
of Barbara O’Nash . . . .”).)   
The factual showing in a post-conviction relief application must be in the form of evidence 
that would be admissible at an evidentiary hearing.  Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 
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P.2d 546, 551 (1982); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).  
Barbara O’Nash’s statement, although ostensibly signed by her, was not notarized in any way that 
verified, under oath, that she signed the statement in the presence of the notary.  (See R., p.54.)  
Because O’Nash’s statement was not a valid affidavit – it was not sworn to or affirmed by O’Nash, 
or made under oath – it was not in the form of admissible evidence, and could not have been 
properly considered in support of Claim 3.  See Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 
(citing Ferrier, 135 Idaho at 799, 25 P.3d at 112); State v. McClure, 159 Idaho 758, ___, 367 P.3d 
153, 155 (2016) (“The Idaho Notary Public Act does define ‘affidavit’: ‘As used in this chapter: 
... (5) ‘Affidavit’ means a declaration in writing, under oath, and sworn to or affirmed by the 
declarant before a person authorized to administer oaths.’  I.C. § 51–102.”); I.C. §19-4902(a) (“the 
authenticity of all documents and exhibits included in or attached to the application must be sworn 
to affirmatively as true and correct”).   
The district court correctly ruled that because Barbara O’Nash’s statement was 
inadmissible hearsay, Cole failed to present any admissible evidence to demonstrate prejudice 
under Strickland.  Cole has failed to show that the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
Claim 3 in regard to Barbara O’Nash’s statement.    
 
(c) Mandy Doherty’s Statement 
 
4. Mandy Doherty’s typed and unsigned statement states that Nicole Lowe and 
Sean Reid “continually torment[ed] Tom Cole every time he came to town 
or drove past the bar.”  (R., p.44.)  The statement recalled one incident when 
Sean Reid was playing with his revolver inside the bar, and when Cole 
drove past the bar, Sean pointed the gun at Cole and pretended to shoot him.  
(R., p.44.) 
 
 As noted, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application must be in the form of 
evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary hearing.  Drapeau, 103 Idaho at 617, 651 P.2d 
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at 551; Cowger, 132 Idaho at 684, 978 P.2d at 244.  Although the district court did not specifically 
discuss Mandy Doherty’s “statement” in its Memorandum Opinion, it was clearly not in the form 
of admissible evidence because it was neither notarized nor signed by anyone.  (R., pp.44, 69-73); 
see I.C. §19-4902(a); Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (the court is not required to 
accept a petitioner’s conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence) (citing Ferrier 
v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)).   
Because Mandy Doherty’s statement was inadmissible, the district court’s all-
encompassing conclusion that Cole “presented no admissible evidence that shows that his 
counsels’ performance prejudiced the outcome of his trial” (R., p.72), correctly applies to her 
stement.  Cole has shown no error in the district court’s summary dismissal of Claim 3 relative to 
Mandy Doherty’s statement.   
 
 (d) Delbert Wadsworth’s Affidavit 
 
5. Delbert Wadsworth’s affidavit states that (a) Cole had stopped by his house 
“one day” and Sean Reid drove up and threw a beer can at Cole yelling, 
“I’m going to fucking kill you[,]” and (b) on “another occasion” Cole told 
him that Ian Reid “had just rammed into his car while driving across the 
bridge,” and Cole “seemed to be in pain [and] said he had suffered whip-
lash.  After that, Ian went into hiding, only coming out after dark.”  (R., 
pp.52-53.)   
 
The district court rejected Delbert Wadsworth’s affidavit on relevance grounds, stating: 
   The affidavit of Delbert Wadsworth appears to have been made in support 
of Cole’s civil matter with the Reids, not his criminal conviction.  It makes no 
reference to the criminal incident.  The statements both discuss incidents involving 
the victims and Cole other than the one charged in this matter and would have been 
inadmissible as not being relevant. 
 
(R., p.72.)    
On appeal, Cole argues that “evidence of the victim threatening to shoot Mr. Cole . . . 
would be relevant to Mr. Cole’s beliefs that he was in imminent danger and thus admissible.  The 
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same is true of a relative of the victim ramming Mr. Cole’s car (for the purposes of summary 
dismissal this statement appearing in Delbert Wadsworth’s affidavit could be considered an 
excited utterance).”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)   
The district court correctly concluded that Wadsworth’s affidavit discusses incidents “other 
than the one charged” and were irrelevant.  (R., p.72.)   Wadsworth’s first statement, that “one 
day” Sean Reid threw a beer can at Cole and threatened to kill him, does not explain when that 
incident occurred in relation to Cole’s underlying crimes.  Therefore, the court properly concluded 
that Cole “offers no proof that he believed he was in imminent danger of death or bodily [sic] or 
that he believed his assault of his ex-wife and friend were necessary to save him from the danger 
presented.”  (R., p.71 (emphasis added).)   
Moreover, while a post-conviction petitioner is entitled to notice prior to the summary 
dismissal of his post-conviction claims from either the court or from the state’s motion to dismiss, 
I.C. § 19-4906; Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 522-523, 236 P.3d 1277, 1282-1283 (2010), an order 
of summary dismissal may be affirmed on appeal on the grounds asserted in the state’s motion to 
dismiss if no material issue of fact on those grounds is contained in the record.  See Ridgley v. 
State, 148 Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.3d 925, 930 (2010); Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 864-865, 243 
P.3d 675, 680-681 (Ct. App. 2010).  In this case, the summary dismissal of Cole’s claim should 
also be affirmed on the alternate ground that he failed to meet the “deficient performance” 
requirement of Strickland.  (See R., p.19 (“The allegations of the petition . . . are bare and 
conclusory, and are not supported by specific facts or evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue 
of material fact.”).)  Cole has made no specific allegation that his trial counsel knew, or should 
have known, about Wadsworth’s potential trial testimony; therefore, he could not have been 
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deficient in failing to call Wadsworth to testify at trial.3  For the above-stated reasons, the district 
court’s summary dismissal of Claim 3, in relation to the first incident described in Wadsworth’s 
affidavit, should be affirmed on the alternative ground that Cole has failed to demonstrate that his 
trial counsel’s conduct was deficient under Strickland.    
Even assuming Wadsworth could have testified at trial about the first incident described in 
his affidavit to show that Sean Reid had an aggressive character trait, see I.R.E. 404(a)(2), Cole 
has not cited any trial testimony showing that, on or near the day of the incident, Sean Reid or 
Nicole Lowe did anything warranting Cole, in self-defense, to threaten them and point a gun at 
them.  See State v. Cole, 2016 WL 455803 *5 (summary of the facts of the case).  Given the 
overwhelming evidence presented at trial showing Cole’s unjustified conduct, see id., any 
impugning of Sean Reid’s character by Wadsworth’s testimony would have been inconsequential.   
Cole has failed to present any cogent argument that shows error in the district court’s determination 
that he failed to demonstrate how, even if Wadsworth had testified about Reid’s alleged threat, the 
outcome of his trial would have been different.  (R., p.72.)    
The second incident Wadsworth’s affidavit described was also irrelevant.  (R., p.72.) 
Wadsworth’s affidavit stated that “on another occasion” Cole came into the Silver Dollar [Bar] 
and told him that “Ian Reid had just rammed into his car while driving across the bridge.”  (R., 
p.53.)  However, that Ian Reid (who, it seems to be implied, may have been related to Sean Reid) 
had an auto accident with Cole’s car says nothing about Sean Reid and Nicole Lowe, or the incident 
                                                          
3  Cole’s third post-conviction claim alleged that his trial counsel “interviewed witness’s [sic] that 
could have backed up [his] story and undermined plaintiffs [sic] integrity and didnt [sic] call them 
to trial.”  (R., p.7.)  Cole’s supporting affidavit alleges that his trial counsel “was given a list of 30 
witness’s [sic] seven of whom were sherriffs [sic] officers.  They would of [sic] undermined the 
integrity of the plaintiffs.”  (R., p.10.)  Nowhere does Cole mention that Delbert Wadsworth was 




in which Cole threatened them with a gun.  The apparent insinuation that Ian Reid did Sean Reid’s 
bidding by ramming his car into Cole’s car is completely baseless.   
Cole has failed to show any error in the district court’s determination that this second 
statement of Wadsworth’s affidavit was irrelevant, and that Cole “presented no admissible 
evidence which shows how he was prejudiced by his counsel not calling witnesses in his defense 




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order summarily 
dismissing Cole’s petition for post-conviction relief. 
 DATED this 5th day of December, 2017. 
 
 
 /s/ John C. McKinney_________________ 
 JOHN C. McKINNEY 
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